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NEW VALUE AND PREFERENCE AvOIDANCE IN BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCTION
A debtor repays a debt to a creditor. Soon thereafter, the debtor fies
bankruptcy.1 The court then forces the creditor to return the payment to
allow the other creditors to share in it.2
Although such a result might seem unfair, it is not.3 Bankruptcy law
establishes priorities for distribution to creditors,4 requiring creditors to
line up for payment on the basis of certain defined criteria. A creditor
who receives payment on the eve of bankruptcy, however, jumps to the
front of the line.5
The law of avoidable preferences exists to prevent such line jumping.
Under the Bankruptcy Code,6 a trustee may bring an action to void cer-
tain of the debtor's pre-bankruptcy transfers made to a creditor.7 Section
547(b)8 of the Bankruptcy Code establishes criteria by which a court de-
termines if a pre-bankruptcy transfer is preferential and therefore voida-
ble. Section 547(c)9 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth seven exceptions
to a trustee's power to void preferential transfers.' 0 The concept of "new
value" plays an integral role in two of the exceptions." Section
547(c)(1)1 2 excepts from avoidance a transfer offset by a contemporane-
ous exchange of new value from a creditor. Section 547(c)(4)13 excepts
1. Filing a petition with a bankruptcy court commences a voluntary bankruptcy. See 11
U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
2. The hypothetical assumes that the transfer meets the criteria of a voidable preference. See
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
3. Although the creditor forced to return the payment might disagree as to the result's fair-
ness, preference law looks toward fairness to the entire group of creditors rather than to one individ-
ual creditor. See infra note 20.
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988) (secured and unsecured claims); 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988) (priori-
ties among unsecured claims).
5. See T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LiMrrs OF BANKRupTcY LAW 9 (1986) (comparing the
priority system for creditors to standing in line at a popular rock concert; those at the front of the
line get the best seats, while those at the end may get no seat at all).
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988). See also infra notes 25-34 and ac-
companying text.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1988).
10. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 547(cXl) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1988).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 547(cX1) (1988).
13. 11 U.S.C § 547(cX4) (1988).
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from avoidance a transfer offset by a subsequent transfer of new value by
a creditor.
Courts have read the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "new value" 14
expansively. 5 This Note argues that such judicial expansions, unsup-
ported by the statutory definition of "new value," tend to undercut the
primary bankruptcy objective of facilitating equal distribution of a
debtor's assets among creditors.
1 6
The Note begins by examining preference law, its history, mechanical
operation, and underlying purpose within bankruptcy. Part II looks at
the two new value exceptions, and at the way in which the exceptions fit
within the overall purposes of bankruptcy. Part III considers whether
Congress intended an exclusive statutory definition of new value. Part
IV surveys judicial decisions that found new value in a creditor's forbear-
ance of an existing legal remedy, 7 a creditor's failure to perfect a statu-
tory lien, 8 a creditor's release of a letter of credit, and a creditor's
granting or honoring of a guarantee.19 Part V presents an analysis of
these judicial decisions. The Note concludes by suggesting that the un-
derlying principle of preference law would be better served by a judicial
test for new value that looked to whether the transfer in question depletes
the debtor's assets to the detriment of other creditors.
I. PREFERENCES
Bankruptcy law provides a collective forum in which the debtor's re-
14. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (1988).
15. See, eg., Reigle v. Mahajan (In re Kumar Bavishi & Assoc.), 906 F.2d 942 (3d Cir. 1990)
(limited partner's guarantee of loan to partnership is new value); LaRose v. Crosby & Son Towing,
Inc. (In re Dick Henley, Inc.), 38 Bankr. 210 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1984).
16. See infra text accompanying note 48. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code iden-
tifies the equality of distribution among creditors as one of Congress' prime objectives. See H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
5963, 6138. See also infra note 33. Of course, no bankruptcy distribution treats all creditors equally.
Those creditors with secured interests in the debtor's property receive the full amount of their claim,
up to the value of the property securing the debt. See Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable
Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REv. 713, 748 (1985). The preference avoidance provision
of the Code tends to preserve equality within the class of unsecured creditors (those creditors with-
out any security interests in the debtor's property) and within the class of undersecured creditors
(those creditors whose claims are secured by a debtor's property with a value less than the amount of
the creditor's claim). Id.
17. See infra notes 59-81 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 82-134 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 135-180 and accompanying text.
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maining assets are distributed among creditors.2" A major principle of
bankruptcy law is that similarly situated creditors must receive an equal
distribution of the debtor's assets.21 A creditor aware of an impending
bankruptcy would prefer to receive payment from a debtor prior to the
filing of bankruptcy in order to get more money.22 However, the law of
avoidable preferences extends the principle of equality of distribution to a
point before the actual bankruptcy.23 "Preferences" are those transfers,
made prior to a filing of bankruptcy, that enable a creditor to receive a
greater share of the debtor's assets than the creditor would otherwise
receive through a bankruptcy distribution.24 A preference is subject to
recapture and distribution with the remainder of the debtor's property.25
Section 547(b) sets forth the elements of a preference. There must be a
"transfer of an interest of the debtor in property."26 The transfer must
be made "to or for the benefit of a creditor. '27  It must be "for or on
account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor."'28 The debtor must
be "insolvent ' 29 at the time of the transfer.30 The transfer must occur
20. See T. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 7-19 (1986). Creditor remedies outside bankruptcy tend
to operate on a first come, first served basis. Id. at 9. These individual remedies may operate detri-
mentally on creditors as a group when the debtor does not have enough assets to satisfy every claim.
Id. at 10. Bankruptcy therefore imposes a compulsory and collective proceeding on creditors that,
in effect, restricts individual creditors for the group's benefit. Id. at 12-13. See generally Jackson,
Bankruptcy, Non Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor's Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
21. Seligson, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act! Three Views on Preferences and After-Acquired
Property, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292 (1967). See also Countryman, supra note 16, at 748; H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 177-78, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963,
6138 ("the preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution").
22. T. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 122, 125.
23. Weisberg, Commercial Morality, The Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable
Preference, 39 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1986). See also Seligson, supra note 21, at 292; Countryman, supra
note 16, at 748.
24. See Weisberg, supra note 23, at 3. See also 11 U.S.C. § 547(bX5) (1988); infra note 29.
25. See McCoid, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L.
REv. 249 (1981). A preference's avoidability is determined by 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). Recovery of
that preference is controlled by 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1988). The property is then preserved for the
benefit of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1988). The property becomes part of the debtor's bankruptcy
estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988) (defining "property of the estate").
26. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). The Code defines "transfer" as "every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an
interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's
equity of redemption." 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1988).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 547(bX1) (1988).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 547(bX2) (1988).
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1988).
30. II U.S.C. § 547(bX3) (1988). The Bankruptcy Code presumes a debtor's insolvency during
the 90 days immediately preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition. I1 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1988).
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within the ninety-day period immediately preceding bankruptcy.3" If the
transferee is a statutory "insider," 32 the preference period extends to one
year.33 Finally, because of the transfer, the creditor must receive a larger
distribution of the debtor's assets than he would receive had the transfer
not been made, and were the creditor instead to receive a distribution in a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation.34
Preference avoidance serves two congressionally stated objectives.35
Avoidance facilitates the bankruptcy principle of equality of distribution
among a bankrupt's creditors. 36 Avoidance also serves to discourage a
race to the courthouse by creditors seeking to dismember a debtor during
his slide into bankruptcy. 37
This presumption shifts the burden of production, but not the burden of proof, from the trustee. See
Jahn v. Reading Body Works, Inc. (In re A. Fassnacht & Sons, Inc.) 45 Bankr. 209 (E.D. Tern
1984).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1988).
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (1988).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1988). A payment to a general unsecured creditor generally will
meet the (h)(5) test as long as the general unsecured creditor would not have received full payment
for its claim. See Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1981). A payment to a
fully secured creditor generally is not a preference because in a Chapter 7 liquidation such a credi-
tor's claim would be paid fully. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 547.08, at 43 (15th ed. 1991).
Thus, such a payment would not meet the (b)(5) element and no preferential transfer would exist.
For a discussion of issues relating to the (b)(5) test, see generally Ward & Shulman, In Defense of the
Bankruptcy Code's Radical Integration of the Preference Rules Affecting Commercial Financing, 61
WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 41-51 (1983).
35. The House Committee Report that accompanied Section 547(b) discussed the purposes of
preference law:
The purpose of the preference section is two-fold. First, by permitting the trustee to avoid
prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short period before bankruptcy, creditors are
discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into
bankruptcy. The protection thus afforded the debtor often enables him to work his way
out of a difficult financial situation through cooperation with all of his creditors. Second,
and more important, the preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of
equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor. Any creditor that received a greater
payment than others of his class is required to disgorge so that all may share equally. The
operation of the preference section to deter "the race of diligence" of creditors to dismem-
ber the debtor before bankruptcy furthers the second goal of the preference section-that
of equality of distribution.
See H.R. REP. supra note 16, at 177-78, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963,
6138.
36. Id.
37. Id. The race to the courthouse is the race of individual creditors to take advantage of state
law remedies. Id. Some dispute exists over whether and to what extent preference law deters credi-
tor behavior. Compare Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 762 n. 111
(1984) (although not a total deterrent, preference law reduces an action's benefit and, thus, reduces
the incidence of the behavior) with McCoid, supra note 25, at 264 (a creditor will keep the transfer if
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In the past, preference law was concerned with the transferor or trans-
feree's intent.3 8 Modern preference law, however, shows no such con-
no bankruptcy is filed, while if bankruptcy is filed, the creditor is, at worst, only forced to return the
payment).
Although to some degree historically linked, preferences are distinguishable from fraudulent con-
veyances. See generally UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1918); UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1984). A fraudulent conveyance is a transfer by a
debtor in an attempt to hide assets from all creditors. Jackson, supra, at 778. A preference, on the
other hand, merely prefers one creditor to the detriment of other creditors. See 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY § 547.01, at 14 (15th ed. 1991). See also Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227
U.S. 575, 582 (1913) (in discussing the difference between a fraudulent conveyance and a preference,
the Court stated: "One is inherently and always vicious; the other innocent and valid, except when
made in violation of the express provisions of a statute. One is malum per se, and the other malum
prohibitum").
Preference law has roots in English conceptions of fraud. See McCoid, supra note 25, at 250;
Countryman, supra note 16, at 714-18. See also Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its
Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 513 (1977) (suggesting that the most famous case in fraudulent
conveyance law, Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601), involved only a
preference, rather than a fraudulent conveyance).
English courts began to develop a separate concept of a voidable preference during the latter half
of the 16th century. The law of the time provided that, when a debtor committed an "act of bank-
ruptcy," creditors could petition the Chancellor for the appointment of Commissioners to administer
the debtor's property for the creditors' benefit. See McCoid, supra note 25, at 250-51. In the Case of
Bankrupts, Lord Coke stated in dictum that it would be "unequal and unconscionable" to allow a
debtor, after he becomes a bankrupt, to prefer a creditor. 76 Eng. Rep. 441, 473 (K.B. 1584). Eng-
lish courts developed Lord Coke's dictum into a "relation-back" rule. The rule deemed that title to
the debtor's property passed to the Commissioners at the time the debtor committed an act of bank-
ruptcy. See McCoid, supra note 25, at 251; Weisberg, supra note 23, at 40-42. Thus, a debtor's
transfer after an act of bankruptcy was void. Weisberg, supra note 23, at 41. However, A preferen-
tial transfer before an act of bankruptcy was safe. Id. at 43.
Lord Manfield, in a series of judicial decisions in the mid-18th century, established a more modern
basis for the recapture of preferential transfers made before bankruptcy. Id. at 46-51 (citing Worsley
v. DeMattos, 96 Eng. Rep. 1160 (K.B. 1758); Alderson v. Temple, 96 Eng. Rep. 384 (K.B. 1768);
and Harman v. Fishar, 98 Eng. Rep. 998 (K.B. 1774)). Lord Mansfield distinguished acceptable
preferences from void preferences in the following manner: If on the eve of bankruptcy a creditor
without fraudulent intent demands a preference, sues the debtor, or threatens the debtor, the prefer-
ence is good; but, if the debtor makes the distribution with "a positive view of iniquity," the prefer-
ence is bad. Alderson v. Temple, 96 Eng. Rep. 384, 385 (K.B. 1768) ("If the conveyance be to
distribute all his effects just as the Statutes of Bankruptcy direct, it is fraudulent and void; because a
man shall not choose his own assignees, and thereby defraud the law, which vests the power over
bankrupts in the Great Seal"). Two major currents within preference law developed from Lord
Mansfield's judicial decisions. First, a preferential transfer made on the eve of bankruptcy is voida-
ble when a debtor attempts to establish his own scheme of distribution. Second, the court should
determine a voidable preference by focusing upon the debtor's intention in making the transfer. See
Weisberg, supra note 23, at 46-47. American law, however, no longer focuses upon the debtor's
intent. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
38. See Weisberg, supra note 23, at 4, 39-55; Countryman, supra note 16, at 718-25. During
the development of English preference law, courts considered the debtor's culpability and found a
preference when the debtor intended his transfer to benefit one creditor over another. See supra note
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cern with the creditor or debtor's culpability; a trustee may avoid
completely innocent transfers that meet the section 547(b) criteria.39
II. EXCEPTIONS
Not all transfers that meet the objective criteria of section 547(b) are
avoidable.' Congress established seven exceptions to the trustee's avoid-
ing power.41  A transfer is shielded from avoidance to the extent the
transfer qualifies under an exception.42 Two of the exceptions require a
transfer of new value from the creditor to the debtor.
The section 547(c)(1) exception provides that a trustee may not avoid a
37. See also Countryman, supra note 16, at 718-20. Although early American preference law re-
tained the English concern over debtor culpability, by the end of the 19th century the focus had
shifted from the debtor's intent to that of the creditor. See McCoid, supra note 25, at 253-59;
Weisberg, supra note 23, at 112-116. See also Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 60(b), 30
Stat. 544, 562 (repealed 1978) (creditor must have reasonable cause to believe that the transferor
intended to give a preference). Subsequent amendments to the Bankruptcy Act changed the require-
ment to a showing by the trustee that the creditor had "reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is
insolvent" at the time of the transfer. See Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 60(b), 52 Stat. 840, 870
(repealed 1978). This was the state of the law until Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act in 1978.
39. See, eg., Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1981) (creditors' knowl-
edge or state of mind no longer relevant); Countryman, supra note 16, at 748 (transfers that distort
the policy of equal distribution "do so without regard to the state of mind of either the debtor or the
preferred creditor"). See generally Weisberg, supra note 23, at 117-33
In the legislative history that accompanies Section 547(b), the House Report discussed the ration-
ale for eliminating any focus on the creditor's state of mind. The House Report began with a discus-
sion of the Bankruptcy Act's preference section.
[ihe trustee must show that the creditor for whose benefit the preferential transfer was
made had "reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer."
This provision was designed when the primary purpose of the preference section was to
prevent the race of diligence. Whether or not a creditor knows or believes that his debtor is
sliding into bankruptcy is important if the only purpose of the preference section is to deter
the race.
However, a creditor's state of mind has nothing whatsoever to do with the policy of
equality of distribution, and whether or not he knows of the debtor's insolvency does little
to comfort other creditors similarly situated who will receive that much less from the
debtor's estate as a result of the prebankruptcy transfer to the preferred creditor. To argue
that the creditor's state of mind is an important element of a preference and that creditors
should not be required to disgorge what they took in supposed innocence is to ignore the
strong bankruptcy policy of equality among creditors. Finally, the requirement that the
trustee prove the state of mind of his opponent is nearly insurmountable, and defeats many
preference actions.
H.R. REP. supra note 16, at 178, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6139
(footnotes omitted).
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1988).
41. Id.
42. See H.R. REP. supra note 16, at 373, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
5963, 6329.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/8
1991] NEW VALUE AND PREFERENCE AVOIDANCE 881
transfer intended by both parties to be a contemporaneous exchange for
new value, provided that it is, in fact, substantially contemporaneous. 43
Although the legislative history indicates the exception is to apply to
transfers by checks,' the language of the statute does not limit the ex-
ception only to such transactions. The exception's apparent rationale is
that the transfer of new value offsets the preference.4 5 Thus, the debtor's
estate is not depleted to other creditors' detriment."
The section 547(c)(4) exception protects a creditor who makes an ad-
vance of new value to the debtor, after the creditor receives a prefer-
ence.47 The amount subsequently advanced protects an equivalent
amount of the preference from avoidance.48 The exception's purpose is
to encourage creditors to continue to deal with troubled businesses.49
43. The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was
made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange.
II U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1988). For a general survey of case law under the exception, see Annotation,
What Falls Within "Contemporaneous Exchange" Exception to Bankruptcy Trustee's Power to Avoid
Transfer of Property by Debtor, Under § 547(c)(1) of Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1), 77
A L.R. FED. 14 (1986).
44. See H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 373, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6329. The House Report states that although a payment by check normally is a credit
transaction, payment by check in the normal course of business is protected by the exception. Id.
This statement contradicts an official comment by Representative Edwards that, contrary to the
language in the House report, unless a check is dishonored, payment by check is a cash payment.
See 124 CONG. REc. 32,400 (1978). See also 124 CONG. REc. 34,000 (1978) (similar statement by
Senator DeConcini). For an overview of court attempts to deal with this controversy, see Note,
"'Transfers by Check'" The 90-Day Rule of Preference Recovery Under Section 547(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 1987 DUKE L.J. 712 (1987).
45. See A.I. Credit Corp. v. Drabkin (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 49 Bankr. 605, 612 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 1985) ("The 'new value' defense is grounded in the principle that the transfer of new value to
the debtor will offset the payments, and the debtor's estate will not be depleted to the detriment of
other creditors"), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
46. Id.
47. The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer, such creditor
gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor-
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an otherwise unavoidable
transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor.
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1988).
48. Id.
49. Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp. (In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp.), 850
F.2d 1275, 1280 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing with approval Chaitman v. Paisano Automotive Liquids, Inc.
(In re Almarc Mfg., Inc.), 62 Bankr. 684, 687-88 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1986)). Generally, a creditor will
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III. NEW VALUE
Since a creditor must provide new value to come within the section
547(c)(1) or section 547(c)(4) exceptions, the definitional boundaries of
new value are critically important. The Bankruptcy Code includes a list
of items and transactions that qualify as new value.50 Courts differ over
whether the list within the statutory definition of new value is exclu-
sive.5 One court that considered the definition to be open-ended found
support in the provision's legislative history.52 In that history, Congress
stated that new value was meant to be defined in its ordinary sense, and is
defined in the Code only to prevent confusion.53
Other courts, however, focus on Congress' choice of statutory lan-
guage, and find the statutory list exclusive.5 4 The Bankruptcy Code's
rules of construction 5 suggest that the use of "includes" creates an open-
ended definition.56 Had Congress wished to create an open-ended defini-
tion, it could have stated what new value "included." Congress chose
not extend further credit to a debtor in shaky financial condition if the creditor fears that bankruptcy
is imminent. In a bankruptcy distribution, a creditor likely would not receive 100% of any extension
of credit, and the creditor could be forced to return any past payments made by a debtor within the
preference period. The 547(c)(4) exception protects any preferential payments to the extent they arc
matched by subsequent extension of credit. Thus, it encourages creditors to extend credit to finan-
cially troubled debtors. Bergquist, 850 F.2d at 1280.
50. "New value" means money or money's worth in goods, services, or new credit, or release by
a transferee of property previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void
nor voidable by the debtor or trustee under any applicable law, including proceeds of such property,
but does not include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2)
(1988).
51. Compare Energy Coop. Inc. v. SOCAP Int'l, Ltd. (In re Energy Coop., Inc.), 832 F.2d 997,
1003 (7th Cir. 1987) (statutory definition is exclusive); Durant's Rental Center, Inc. v. United Truck
Leasing, Inc. (In re Durant's Rental Center, Inc.) 116 Bankr. 362, 365 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990)
(same) and Simon v. Engineered Protection Sys., Inc. (In re Hatfield Elec. Co.), 91 Bankr. 782, 784-
85 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (same) with LaRose v. Crosby & Son Towing, Inc. (In re Dick Henley,
Inc.), 38 Bankr. 210, 213 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1984) (statutory definition is open-ended).
52. LaRose v. Crosby & Son Towing, Inc. (In re Dick Henley, Inc.), 38 Bankr. 210, 213
(Bankr. M.D. La. 1984) ("If the Congressional intent was to define 'new value' in its ordinary sense,
the list of 'goods, services, or new credit' must not be exclusive").
53. See H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 372, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6328; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5873 ("Subsection (a) contains three definitions. Inventory, new value, and
receivable are defined in their ordinary senses, but are defined to avoid any confusion or uncertainty
surrounding the terms").
54. Energy Coop., Inc. v. SOCAP Int'l, Ltd. (In re Energy Coop., Inc.), 832 F.2d 997, 1003
(7th Cir. 1987); Simon v. Engineered Systems (In re Hatfield Elec. Co.), 91 Bankr. 782, 784-85
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) (1988) ("includes" and "including" are not limiting).
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not to do so; instead, Congress stated what "new value" meant.57 Thus,
these courts reason, Congress did not create an open-ended definition.
IV. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF NEW VALUE
Courts have expanded the definition of new value to include forbear-
ance of an existing remedy, forbearance in perfecting a statutory lien, a
release of a letter of credit, and the making and honoring of a guarantee.
Expanding the boundaries of new value provides the protection of the
new value exceptions to many creditors. This, in turn, makes fewer
transfers voidable. The net result is that creditors keep otherwise voida-
ble transfers. This result undercuts the prime bankruptcy goal of equal-
ity of distribution among creditors.5"
A. Forbearance of Existing Remedies
Most courts have not viewed the forbearance of an existing remedy as
new value.59 A minority of courts have, however, held that a forbearance
is new value if the non-action by the creditor makes possible the contin-
ued use of property essential to a debtor's business.6"
The earliest decisions under the Bankruptcy Code6' held that a for-
bearance was not new value.6 2 The bankruptcy court, in In re Duffy,63
held that a creditor's decision not to repossess the debtor's leased car did
not constitute new value because the forbearance did not enhance the
57. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
58. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 16, at 178, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6139.
59. See, e.g., American Bank v. Leasing Serv. Corp. (In re Air Conditioning, Inc. of Stuart),
845 F.2d 293, 298 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 993 (1988); Drabkin v. A.I. Credit Corp., 800
F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Dent (In re Trans Air, Inc.), 78 Bankr.
351, 354-55 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); Alithochrome Corp. v. East Coast Finishing Sales Corp. (In re
Alithochrome Corp.), 53 Bankr. 906, 912-13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). However, some courts have
held that a forbearance in perfecting a statutory lien does constitute new value. See infra notes 103-
109 and accompanying text.
60. See, eg., Remes v. Yeomans (In re Quality Plastics), 41 Bankr. 241, 243 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1984). Cf. Charisma Inv. Co. v. Airport Sys., Inc. (In re Jet Florida Sys.), 841 F.2d 1082,
1084 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (dictum suggests a lessor's forbearance in terminating lease might constitute
new value if the lessee continues to use the property).
61. The present Bankruptcy Code was created by Congress' adoption of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
62. See, eg, Bavely v. Merchants Nat'l Bank (In re Lario), 36 Bankr. 582, 584 (Bankr. D. Ohio
1983); In re Duffy, 3 Bankr. 263, 266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
63. 3 Bankr. 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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value of the debtor's estate.64 The court viewed the forbearance as a sub-
stitution of an obligation for an existing obligation: the creditor ex-
changed a right of immediate possession of the car for a future right of
repossession.65 This, the court noted, was expressly excluded by the stat-
utory definition of new value. 6
6
The bankruptcy court, in Remes v. Yeomans (In re Quality Plastics),67
distinguished Duffy and found that new value existed when a lessor failed
to repossess a machine necessary to the operation of the debtor's busi-
ness.6 8 The court held that the sale of products created by the machine
augmented the estate to the creditors' benefit. 69 Since the creditor's for-
bearance was an essential prerequisite to the debtor's use of the machine,
the court held that forbearance of repossession constituted new value.70
The subsequent new value given by the creditor was sufficient to protect
the transfer from avoidance.71
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in Drabkin v. A.L Credit
Corp. ,72 expressly disagreed with the approach taken in Quality Plas-
64. Id. at 266.
65. Id.
66. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (1988) (new value "does not include an obligation substi-
tuted for an existing obligation").
67. 41 Bankr. 241 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984).
68. Id. at 243.
69. Id.
70. Id. The court rejected the trustees argument that the new value found was speculative. Id.
The court identified the new value as the accrual of unpaid post-transfer rentals. Such accrual was
an unsecured debt. Thus, under the court's analysis, the new value represented a release of an
unsecured debt. Id.
71. Id. The Eleventh Circuit, in dictum, expressed some support for a position analogous to
that in Quality Plastics. See Charisma Inv. Co. v. Airport Sys., Inc. (In re Jet Florida Sys.), 841
F.2d 1082, 1084 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (essor's refusal to terminate a lease might be new value if debtor
stayed and used the property). See also 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1988).
72. 800 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The debtor was Auto Train Corporation (Auto Train).
The creditor, A.I. Credit Corporation (AICCO), was a premium financing company, a company that
loaned money to enterprises to enable them to prepay yearly property and casualty insurance poli-
cies. Id. at 1154-55. AICCO loaned Auto Train $1,357,347.99 to purchase an insurance policy. Id.
at 1155. AICCO took a security interest in the policy's unearned premiums and retained the rights,
if Auto Train defaulted, to cancel the policy and to reclaim the unearned premiums. AICCO
designed a repayment plan that ensured that the available funds of unearned premiums always ex-
ceeded the unrepaid portion of the loan. The repayment schedule's effect ensured that AICCO
would be oversecured at all times, provided that Auto Train made its scheduled payments. But
when a check offered for payment by Auto Train was dishonored, AICCO had the option of cancel-
ing the policy, recovering approximately one million dollars, and taking a $300,000 loss on the loan.
AICCO chose, however, not to cancel the policy. The parties created a new repayment plan under
which Auto Train made sporadic payments totalling $155,000 during the 90 days prior to its bank-
ruptcy filing. Id. The Drabkin court held that these payments were preferential. Id. at 1157. The
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/8
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tics ." The Drabkin court held that the forbearance of an existing right
could not constitute new value.7 4 The court, however, declined to rely
on the rationale provided by the Duffy court.75 Instead, it offered an
analysis based on the bankruptcy principle of equality of distribution
among creditors. 76 In the Drabkin court's view, the Quality Plastics ap-
proach allowed undersecured creditors77 an opportunity to use the threat
of repossession to reduce the unsecured portion of their claim.78 If the
undersecured collateral were necessary to the operation of a debtor's
business, the creditor would have great leverage to force a preferential
payment.79 Defining such forbearance as new value allowed a creditor
the use of the two new value exceptions.8 ' The Drabkin court believed
such a result encouraged creditors to force preferential payments, a con-
sequence completely at odds with the principles underlying preference
avoidance.81
B. New Value and Statutory Liens
Although a properly perfected statutory lien" is protected from pref-
erence avoidance,83 payments to holders of unperfected statutory liens
court also held that AICCO's action in choosing not to cancel the insurance amounted to a forbear-
ance, and, as such, did not constitute new value sufficient to shield the preference from avoidance.
Id. at 1159.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at n.7.
76. Id. at 1159.
77. An undersecured creditor is one whose security interest in collateral has a fair market value
less than the creditor's claim. Thus, a portion of the creditor's claim is unsecured. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 506 (1988).
78. 800 F.2d at 1159.
79. Id.
80, 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1988).
81. 800 F.2d at 1159. Judge Silberman noted that the court's decision could induce under-
secured creditors to foreclose earlier on debtors. However undesirable this result, the court found it
better than the alternative of favoring undersecured creditors at the expense of general unsecured
creditors. Id. The court also asserted that its holding had the advantage of providing legal certainty
to parties in a commercial transaction, a result a contrary decision could not bring about. Id. at n.9.
82. Statutory liens make specific property security for the payment of a debt. See generally 53
C.J.S. LIENS § 8 (1987). State statutes often provide liens to people supplying labor, equipment, or
materials in a construction project. See generally 57 C.J.S. MECHANIC'S LIENS § 1 (1948). For the
hens to be effective, they must be perfected by filing a statement with a court within a statutorily
defined time. See, eg., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 429.170 (Vernon 1952 & 1991 Supp.) (six months for a
contractor, 60 days for a day laborer).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6) (1988) (excepting from avoidance the fixing of a statutory lien that is
not avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 545). Since the holder of a properly perfected lien has a secured
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may be subject to preference attack,8 4 and creditors have attempted to
shield these transfers through the use of the two new value exceptions.85
Litigation concerning new value and statutory liens has focused on a
few discrete areas of dispute.86 Most courts accept that new value must
have some "value."87 Thus, the property subject to the lien must have
some monetary worth if the lien is to have value.88 Courts split, how-
ever, over whether a forbearance in perfecting a lien constitutes new
value.8 9 Those courts that find new value in a forbearance to perfect split
further over whether new value may be found in the reduction of a third
party's unsecured contingent claim for indemnification that results from
a payment to an unperfected lien holder.90
1. Waiver of a Statutory Lien on Valueless Property
Courts differ over whether new value requires appraisal of the value
given.91 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Kenan v. Fort
Worth Pipe Co. (In re George Rodman),92 held that no appraisal was
necessary.9a George Rodman involved the release of a properly perfected
lien held on an exploratory oil well. 94 The owner discovered the oil well
was worthless.95 The court held that section 547(a)(2)'s plain language
did not require appraisal of the property transferred in the exchange.
96
The court held that the release of the valueless lien constituted new value
contemporaneously given sufficient to shield a payment to the creditor
from avoidance. 97
interest, a payment to the lienholder generally will not meet the § 547(b)(5) test, and will not be a
preference. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 547.14, at 64 (15th ed. 1991).
84. See infra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
85. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1988).
86. See infra notes 89-134 and accompanying text. For a further survey of cases dealing with
these disputes, see Note, Bankruptcy Preference Actions: New Value and Inchoate Statutory Liens-
An Examination of the Definitive Case Law Split, 21 U. WEsT L.A. L. REV. 89 (1990).
87. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
88. See id.
89. See infra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
92. 792 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1986).
93. Id. at 128.
94. Id. at 126.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 128.
97. Id. Although a payment in exchange for the release of a properly perfected lien generally
will not be a preference, see supra note 83, an exception may exist where the value of the property
securing the lien is less than the creditor's claim. If the property is worthless, a payment may enable
[Vol. 69:875
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The Tenth Circuit appears subsequently to have abandoned George
Rodman in Lowrey v. U.P.G., Inc. (In re Robinson Brothers Drilling,
Inc.).98 The court interpreted George Rodman to mean that no valuation
was required at the time of an adversarial hearing, as long as the lien had
some value at the time of the transfer.99
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Milchem, Inc v.
Fredman (In re NuCorp Energy, Inc.),"° held that a release of a right to
perfect a statutory lien did not constitute new value when, at the time of
the transfer, the underlying property subject to the lien was valueless. 1 '
The Ninth Circuit, however, declined to reach the issue of whether for-
bearance from perfecting a lien could, in and of itself, constitute new
value. 102
2. Waiver of a Lien Right Against a Debtor's Property
Several early decisions under the Bankruptcy Code held that a credi-
tor's forbearance in perfecting a statutory lien constitutes new value.
10 3
The bankruptcy court, in Weill v. Evans Lumber Co. (In re Johnson),"°
held that relinquishing a right to perfect a lien constituted new value.' °5
The court stated that the definition of new value was meant to continue a
rule established by judicial interpretations under the old Bankruptcy
Act."° Under such interpretations, a transfer to a creditor that dis-
charged an inchoate lien was not an avoidable preference."17 The John-
son court found that such transfers did not diminish the debtor's assets
available to pay other creditors; thus, they did not prefer the creditor. 10
the creditor to receive more than she would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. This would meet the
§ 547(bX5) element, and, if all other elements of § 547(b) were met, a preference would exist. See
generally 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
98. 877 F.2d 32 (10th Cir. 1989).
99. Id. at 33.
100. 902 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1990).
101. Id. at 733.
102. Id. at n.4.
103. See, e.g., Cooley v. General Elevator Corp. (In re Advanced Contractors), 44 Bankr. 239,
241 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984); Weill v. Evans Lumber Co. (In re Johnson), 25 Bankr. 889, 893-94
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
104. 25 Bankr. 889 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
105. Id. at 893-94.
106. Id. at 893. The Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), was repealed
by The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which established the present Bankruptcy Code. See Pub.
L No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
107. 25 Bankr. at 893 (citing Greenblat v. Utley, 240 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1956)).
108. Id.
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Several courts have followed the Johnson court analysis. 10
The Northern District of Texas, in Cimarron Oil Co. v. Cameron Con-
sultants, Inc. , l1 however, declined to follow Johnson and its progeny.II t
The Cimarron court held that, because a forbearance to perfect a statu-
tory lien was not within new value's exclusive statutory definition, the
forbearance was not new value and could not protect a transfer from
avoidance. 112
The Cimarron court suggested a means of obtaining an equitable result
without sacrificing principled statutory interpretation. 1 3 The court held
that section 547(c)(6),114 an exception that protects the fixing of certain
statutory liens, protected the transfer from avoidance. I" Relying on the
legislative history to the exception, the court found a congressional intent
to shield from avoidance transfers that preclude the imposition of statu-
tory liens.116
3. Waiver of Lien Rights Against Third Parties
Courts differ over whether a waiver of lien rights against third parties
109. See, eg., Cooley v. General Elevator Corp. (In re Advanced Contractors), 44 Bankr. 239
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984); LaRose v. Crosby & Son Towing, Inc. (In re Dick Henley, Inc.), 38 Bankr
210 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1984).
110. 71 Bankr. 1005 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
111. Id. at 1009-10.
112. Id. at 1009. The court found the definition exclusive because Congress stated what new
value meant, rather than what new value "included." Id. See also supra notes 54-57 and accompa-
nying text.
113. 71 Bankr. at 1010-11. The equitable concern to which the court refers may be the same as
identified in LaRose v. Crosby & Sons Towing, Inc. (In re Dick Henley, Inc.), 38 Bankr. 210 (Bankr.
M.D. La. 1984). The Dick Henley court suggested a debtor could pay his creditors within 90 days of
the bankruptcy, wait until after the statutory period for lien perfection and then file an action to
recover a preference. The creditor, having received payment, would have no way to protect his lien
right. The Dick Henley court viewed this as inequitable. Id. at 215.
114. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6) (1988).
115. 71 Bankr. at 1010-11.
116. Id. Some courts have questioned the Cimarron court's analysis of the legislative history of
§ 547(c)(6). See, eg., Simon v. Engineered Protection Sys., Inc. (In re Hatfield Elec. Co.), 91 Bankr.
782 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). The Hatfield Electric court stated that the legislative history reveals
that language broadening the § 547(c)(6) exception to include satisfaction of statutory liens was
deleted from the statute before passage of the final bill. Id. at 786 (citing H.R. REP., supra note 16,
at 374, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6330; S. REP., supra note 53, at
88, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5874). The Hatfield court refers to
language stating that the (c)(6) exception protects transfers in satisfaction of such liens, language not
reflected in the statute. See S. REP., supra note 53, at 88, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo. &
ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5874. See also Note, supra note 86, at 100-01 (student author states a view
similar to that of Hatfield court).
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constitutes new value.I 7 A bankruptcy court, in LaRose v. Crosby & Son
Towing, Inc. (In re Dick Henley, Inc.), I" held that, when a waiver of lien
rights against a third party's property results in the reduction of a
debtor's contingent liability for indemnification, the reduction constitutes
new value." 9 In LaRose, a creditor-subcontractor held a lien on prop-
erty on which the creditor had worked.120 The property owner held a
claim for indemnification against the debtor-general contractor.1 21 Upon
receiving a payment from the debtor, the creditor released its lien against
the owner, and the owner released the indemnity claim against the
debtor.' 22 The court held that a release or reduction of an indemnity
claim, in these circumstances, constituted contemporaneously exchanged
new value sufficient to protect the payment to the creditor from
avoidance.123
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Nordberg v. Arab
Banking Corp. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.),124 described the LaRose
117. Compare Lang v. Heieck Supply (In re Anderson Plumbing Co.), 71 Bankr. 19 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1986) (new value); Cooley v. General Elevator Corp. (In re Advanced Contractors), 44
Bankr. 239 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (same) and LaRose v. Crosby and Son Towing, Inc. (In re Dick
Henley, Inc.), 38 Bankr. 210 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1984) (same) with Simon v. Engineered Protection
Sys., Inc. (In re Hatfield Elec. Co.), 91 Bankr. 782 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (not new value); Rags-
dale v. M & M Elec. Supply, Inc. (In re Central Elec., Inc.), 66 Bankr. 624 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986)
(same) and Tidwell v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (In re Georgia Steel, Inc.), 56 Bankr. 509 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1985) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 66 Bankr. 932 (M.D. Ga. 1986).
118. 38 Bankr. 210 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1984).
119. Id. at 215.
120. Id. at 212-13. The Hen arose under Louisiana state law. Id. at 212 (citing LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:4802(B) (West 1965)).
121. Id. at 212-13. Louisiana law provided that the general contractor must indemnify the
owner for any claim arising out of the work performed. Id. at 212 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:4802(F) (West 1965)).
122. Id. at 213.
123. Id. at 215. The court held that § 547(cXl) protected the transfer from avoidance. The
court offered two alternate rationales for its holding. Id. First, the statutory definition of new value
was not exclusive. Id. at 213. The court looked to the legislative history of§ 547(aX2), which stated
that new value was to be defined in its ordinary sense. Id. (citing S. REP., supra note 53, at 87,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5873). In the court's view, a non-
exclusive definition of new value meant interpreting it in its ordinary sense. Thus, the court added
an unsecured indemnity claim to the statutory list. Id.
Alternatively, the court argued that a lien release fit the statutory definition of a "release of prop-
erty previously transferred to such transferee." Id. (citing the language of 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2)
(1988)). Although the lien was released to the owner, the court held that a constructive release
resulted to the debtor when the owner released the debtor's indemnity obligation. Id. at 215. The
court's decision may have been driven by equitable concerns that a contrary decision could deny the
subcontractor its lien rights. Id.
124. 904 F.2d 588 (11th Cir. 1990).
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holding as a "circular and ill-founded evasion of the policy against pref-
erential transfers. ' 125 Looking to the facts in LaRose, the Nordberg
court reasoned that if the debtor-general contractor had not made the
preferential payments, the subcontractor would have foreclosed its lien
on the owner's property. 126 The owner would then have enforced its un-
secured right of indemnification against the debtor. 127 Thus, the only
value the debtor gained was the release of a contingent, unsecured, ante-
cedent debt. 2 ' The payment preferred one creditor without providing
anything of tangible value to the debtor's estate.' 29 In the court's view,
such payment depleted the estate to other creditors' detriment-the very
essence of a preference.
130
Similarly, Simon v. Engineered Protection Systems (In re Hatfield Elec-
tric Co.)131 held that the release of an unsecured claim for indemnity did
not constitute new value.' 32 The court stated that the release of the in-
demnity claim, which resulted from the waiver of a lien, did not fit within
the exclusive definition of new value.' 33 The court rejected judicial ex-
pansion of new value, finding that such expansion was not within its
power and would conflict with the congressional purpose of promoting
equal distribution among creditors.
134
C. Letters of Credit
In some circumstances, a creditor may provide new value indirectly
through a third party. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fuel Oil Supply & Terminaling, Inc. (In re Fuel Oil
Supply & Terminaling, Inc.),135 held that a creditor's release of a letter of
125. Id. at 596 (dictum).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fuel Oil Supply & Terminaling, Inc. (In re Fuel Oil Supply
& Terminaling, Inc.), 837 F.2d 224, 230 (5th Cir. 1988) (dictum criticizing LaRose). The Eleventh
Circuit stated that it agreed fully with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning. See 904 F.2d at 596.
131. 91 Bankr. 782 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
132. Id. at 785.
133. Id.
134. Id. The court viewed expansion of the definition of new value to be a legislative rather than
judicial function. Id. See also Note, supra note 86, at 104-05 (student author argues that courts have
invaded a congressional function by expanding the definition of new value to include the forbearance
of a statutory lien).
135. 837 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988). GulfOil involved a transaction between two oil companies.
The creditor, Gulf Oil Corp. (Gulf), supplied the debtor, Fuel Oil Supply and Terminaling, Inc.
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credit13 6 constituted new value.137 The court set forth two conditions for
finding new value in such circumstances.13 1 First, the creditor's release
must be followed by the issuing bank's release of collateral securing the
letter of credit.'3 9 Second, the issuing bank must be fully secured."4  In
the court's view, the release of the letter of credit made possible the re-
lease of the collateral. 4 ' Since the collateral's release offset the debtor's
transfer, the exchange did not deplete the debtor's estate to other credi-
tor's disadvantage.'42 The court held that the section 547(c)(1) exception
protected the transfer. 143
D. Guarantees
A creditor's guarantee'" of a debtor's obligation may constitute new
value. Guarantees may shield a preferential transfer in two ways. A
court may view the creditor's guarantee as a contemporaneous transfer of
new value, 145 or a court may view the later honoring of a guarantee as a
subsequent transfer of new value.' 6 The Third Circuit exhaustively ad-
(FOSTI), with gasoline in return for a promise to return the same amount in two months. Id. Gulf
required FOSTI to pay a fee for the use of the gasoline and to provide Gulf with a letter of credit
securing the obligation. FOSTI pledged collateral that exceeded the value of the letter of credit. Id.
at 225. Upon the return of the gasoline and payment of the promised fee, Gulf canceled one letter of
credit and allowed another to expire. When an involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against
FOSTI, FOSTI, as debtor in possession, attempted to recover the value of the 200,000 barrels of
gasoline it had transferred to Gulf, alleging that the transfer was a voidable preference. Id. at 226.
136. A letter of credit is "[ain engagement by a bank... made at the request of a customer that
the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment upon compliance with the conditions
specified in the credit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 903.04 (6th ed. 1990). Gulf Oil involved a
standby letter of credit. 837 F.2d at 225. A standby letter of credit "commits the issuer to honor the
credit... upon evidence or a mere declaration of the customer's default in the underlying transac-
tion with the beneficiary." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 904 (6th ed. 1990). See generally Baird,
Standby Letters of Credit in Bankruptcy, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 130, 133-36 (1982); McLaughlin, Let-
ters of Credit as Preferential Transfers in Bankruptcy, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 1033, 1036-40 (1982).
137. 837 F.2d at 230-31.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. However, if an issuing bank were undersecured, its release of collateral would not offset
completely the preferential payment to the creditor. In that event, the preferential transfer would
deplete the estate to the detriment of other creditors. Id.
141. Id. at 228-29.
142. Id. at 230.
143. Id. at 231. See also 11 U.S.C. § 547(cXl) (1988).
144. A guarantee is "[a]n agreement in which the guarantor agrees to satisfy the debt of another
(the debtor), only if and when the debtor fails to repay." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 705 (6th ed.
1990).
145. See, eg., Reigle v. Mahajan (In re Kumar Bavishi & Assoc.), 906 F.2d 942 (3d Cir. 1990).
146. See, eg., Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp. (In re Bellanca Aircraft
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dressed this issue in Reigle v. Mahajan (In re Kumar Bavishi & Associ-
ates).147 By a vote of two to one, the court held that a personal
guarantee constituted new value. 148
Kumar Bavishi involved a financially troubled limited partnership to
which a bank refused to provide new credit, unless the limited partners
individually guaranteed repayment.1 49 The partnership owed an antece-
dent debt to the limited partners.1 50 In order to induce one of the limited
partners to provide a guarantee, the general partner paid a portion of the
antecedent debt to the limited partner.1 5 ' This payment equalled the lim-
ited partner's expected exposure on the guarantee.1 52 Although it found
this payment to be a preference, the Third Circuit held that section
547(c)(1) protected the payment from avoidance.1 53
The majority in Kumar Bavishi viewed the guarantee as a necessary
factor that enabled the partnership to receive an infusion of new
credit.1 54 Thus, the court held that the guarantee constituted new value
under the statutory definition as either "new credit" or "services.' 55 In
the majority's view, an increased cash flow from the loan process placed
the debtor in a better position than it had been in before the transfer.156
The majority found that the transfer did not deplete the debtor's es-
tate. 1 57 The court attempted to balance the transaction by matching loan
proceeds with the debtor's obligation to repay.15 8 It next matched the
preferential payment to the limited partner with a reduction in the un-
Corp.), 56 Bankr. 339 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 850 F.2d 1275
(8th Cir. 1988). In Bellanca Aircraft, the bankruptcy court declined to hold that the giving of a
guarantee, in and of itself, constituted new value. The court held that the honoring of a guarantee
did constitute new value subsequently given and held that § 547(c)(4) shielded the transfer. 56
Bankr. at 394 and n.59.
147. 906 F.2d 942 (3d Cir. 1990).
148. Id. at 944.
149. Id. at 943.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 946. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1988).
154. 906 F.2d at 945.
155. Id. The Third Circuit found support for its holding in dicta from a footnote in the bank-
ruptcy court's decision in Eisenberg v. J.L. Int'l, Ltd. (In re Sider Ventures & Serv. Corp.), 33
Bankr. 708 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 47 Bankr. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See
906 F.2d at 945, 947. The Sider court suggested that a guarantee could be characterized as either
"new credit" or a "service." 33 Bankr. at 712 n.2.
156. 906 F.2d at 945.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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secured debt the debtor owed to the limited partner who provided the
guarantee.1 59 The court viewed this interaction as an equivalent interac-
tion that did not deplete the debtor's estate." °
Judge Cowen dissented.1 61 He argued that the personal guarantee was
neither new credit nor services and therefore was not within the statutory
definition of new value.162 He asserted that to view the guarantee as new
credit presented inherent valuation problems. 163 Since multiple guaran-
tees were made, each guarantor might claim that his guarantee equalled
the entire loan proceeds. 16 Such a valuation would result in advancing a
total amount of new value far in excess of the amount of the loan.165 If
the court valued the guarantee at the portion of the new loan that the
guarantors eventually honored, the guarantors, together, would have a
new value claim equivalent to the amount of the loan. 66 The bank also
had a potential new value claim for the amount of the loan proceeds.167
Thus, a single loan could provide twice its amount in new value.1 6 8 The
dissent viewed either possible valuation as absurd and unfair. 61
In addition, Judge Cowen refused to accept the majority's characteri-
zation of the guarantee as a service.1 70 For the guarantee to be "money's
worth" in a "service," it is necessary to value the guarantee at the time of
exchange.1 7 He suggested that to properly value the guarantee as a ser-
vice, one could consider both the expected and the potential liability, and
then discount that amount by the possibility of the debtor's default.' 72
However, the guarantee's value at the time of transfer would not neces-
159. Id.
160. Id. It is questionable how the court can justify its view that a reduction in unsecured debt
is an equivalent exchange for a preferential transfer. A transfer to an unsecured creditor that
reduces an antecedent unsecured debt would appear to be the essence of a preference. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b) (1988).
161. 906 F.2d at 946 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 947.
163. Id. at 948.
164. Id. There were at least five other guarantors in Kumar Bavishi. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. The guarantors honoring their guarantee will extinguish the bank's claim against the
debtor. The bank could, however, shield payments made by the debtor, for antecedent debts, prior
to the loan by characterizing the loan as subsequent new value. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1988).
168. 906 F.2d at 948.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 948-49.
171. Id. at 949 (citing Creditor's Comm. v. Spada (In re Spada), 903 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1990)).
172. Id. at 948.
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sarily equal the amount of the preference.1 73 Judge Cowen asserted that
the section 547(c)(1) exception only shielded a transfer to the extent the
creditor gave new value.1 74 Because the record lacked any evidence of
the guarantee's actual value as a service, Judge Cowen concluded that
the exception did not apply."'
Judge Cowen also rejected any analysis that viewed the guarantor's
honoring of the guarantee as subsequent new value provided to the
debtor.'76 He argued that such an analysis incorrectly focused on a det-
riment to a preferred creditor, rather than on whether the honoring of
the guarantee had augmented the debtor's estate. 177 He found that no
benefit accrued to the debtor upon the subsequent honoring of the guar-
antee.17 In his view, the honoring of the guarantee merely shifted the
creditors' identity, and the guarantors now had an unsecured claim
against the debtor. 179 Thus, he found that neither the giving nor the
honoring of the guarantee constituted new value.'80
V. ANALYSIS
Preference law's primary purpose is to ensure an equal distribution
among creditors.' 8 ' This purpose reinforces bankruptcy's role as a col-
lective debt-collection proceeding.'1 2 However, courts that expansively
define new value allow too many creditors to use the exceptions to prefer-
ence avoidance.' 83 Such expansive construction of new value undercuts
173. Id. In most cases, the value would be less. Id.
174. Id. at 949. See also Jet Florida, Inc. v. American Airlines (In re Jet Florida Sys., Inc.), 861
F.2d 1555, 1558-59 (11th Cir. 1988) (@ 547(c)(1) requires a specific valuation of the new value in the
exchange).
175. 906 F.2d at 948-49. Judge Cowen regarded this value as too indeterminate and speculative
to serve as new value in this context. Id.
176. Id. at 50. Judge Cowen also queried whether a post-petition advance of new value qualified
under § 547(c). Id. at 951 n.9. Compare Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp. (In re
Bellanca Aircraft Corp.), 850 F.2d 1275, 1284-85 (8th Cir. 1988) (not allowing post-petition ad-
vances to qualify under § 547(c)(4)) and Wolinsky v. Central Vt. Teacher's Credit Union (In re
Ford), 98 Bankr. 669, 683 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1989) (same) with Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. Nooney
Co. (In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc.), 28 Bankr. 87 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1983) (allowing post petition
advances to qualify). See 906 F.2d at 951 n.9.
177. 906 F.2d at 950.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 950-51.
180. Id. at 947.
181. See supra notes 16, 21, 35 and accompanying text.
182. For a discussion of bankruptcy as a collective debt proceeding, see supra note 20 and au-
thorities cited therein.
183. Because a creditor must provide new value to fall within the § 547(c)(1) or § 547(c)(4)
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the efficacy of preference law and the effectiveness of bankruptcy itself.I84
A narrow construction of new value brings fewer creditors within the
exceptions to preference avoidance' 85 and allows the congressionally
mandated balance of preference and exception to operate as designed.1
8 6
Under the better view, forbearance from the exercise of an existing
legal remedy is not new value. 87 Neither the statutory definition nor the
underlying principles of preference law support holding that a creditor's
forbearance constitutes new value.'18  As the D.C. Circuit illustrated, a
finding by courts of new value in forbearance could encourage creditors
to force preferential payments.' 8 9 Such a result undercuts the bank-
ruptcy principle of equal distribution among creditors. 19
Similarly, failure to perfect a statutory Hen should not be viewed as
new value.' 91 The first bankruptcy court that characterized it as such
did not attempt to apply new value's statutory definition.' 92 Instead, the
court simply assumed that prior decisions under the repealed Bankruptcy
Act automatically applied to the new Bankruptcy Code.' 93 However,
forbearance in the perfection of a statutory lien is not within the Bank-
ruptcy Code's exclusive list of what constitutes new value. 94 Further-
more, the failure to perfect a lien because of a payment presents equitable
concerns if the payment is avoided.' The Cimarron court, however,
provided an avenue by which principled statutory interpretation may be
balanced with equity.' 96 Such an approach is more appropriate than dis-
exceptions, an expansive construction of new value necessarily allows more creditors to use the
exceptions.
184. See generally Drabkin v. A.I. Credit Corp., 800 F.2d 1153, 1158-59 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
185. Because a creditor must provide new value to fall within the § 547(c)(1) or § 547(c)(4)
exceptions, a narrow construction of new value necessarily prevents some creditors from using the
exceptions.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988) and 11 US.C. § 547(c) (1988).
187. See In re Duffy, 3 Bankr. 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
188. See Drabkin, 800 F.2d at 1158-59.
189. Id. at 1159.
190, Id.
191. See Cimarron Oil Co. v. Cameron Consultants, Inc., 71 Bankr. 1005 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1987).
192. See Weill v. Evans Lumber Co. (In re Johnson), 25 Bankr. 889, 893 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982).
193. Id. For a discussion of the since-repealed Bankruptcy Act, see supra note 106.
194. See Cimarron Oil Co., 71 Bankr. at 1009.
195. See LaRose v. Crosby & Son Towing, Inc. (In re Dick Henley, Inc.), 38 Bankr. 210, 215
(Bankr. M.D. La. 1984). See also supra note 113.
196. See 71 Bankr. at 1010-11. This avenue consists of using the § 547(c)(6) exception to shield
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torting new value to achieve an equitable result in one set of cases. 197
The release of an unsecured indemnity claim should not constitute new
value as well. Payments to creditors in satisfaction of antecedent un-
secured debts are nearly always preferences if made within the preference
period. 198 Yet, the LaRose court held that such a payment was protected
because a third party's release of an unsecured claim constituted new
value sufficient to bring the transfer within an exception.199 This result
illustrates that the consequence of judicial decisions that overly expand
the reach of new value is to protect clearly preferential transfers from
avoidance.
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, keeping with congressional intent, held
that a release of a standby letter of credit that results in a fully secured
issuing bank's release of collateral to a debtor is new value.2 ' A three-
way transaction should not inherently prevent the debtor from receiving
new value.2 ' The key to the Fifth Circuit's analysis was the release of a
fully secured claim on the debtor's property.20 2 This release completely
offset the debtor's payment, and the release of the letter of credit did not
deplete the debtor's estate to other creditors' detriment.20 3 Thus, the
court's finding of new value in these circumstances did not undermine
the primary bankruptcy principle of equality of distribution among
creditors.
As with forbearances of legal remedies, failures to perfect statutory
liens and releases of unsecured indemnity claims, a guarantee is not new
value. The Third Circuit's analysis2 4 in so construing a guarantee is
flawed.20 5 The dissent presented the better view. Neither the granting
nor the honoring of the guarantee provided new value sufficient to shield
the preference. As the dissent illustrated, to construe the guarantee as
new credit presents inherent valuation problems.20 6 To regard the guar-
a transfer that causes a creditor to forbear perfecting a lien. Id. See also supra notes 113-116 and
accompanying text.
197. See generally 71 Bankr. at 1010-11.
198. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
199. 38 Bankr. at 215.
200. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fuel Oil Supply & Terminaling, Inc. (In re Fuel Oil Supply &
Terminaling, Inc.), 837 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988).
201. Id. at 230-231.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Reigle v. Mahajan (In re Kumar Bavishi & Assoc.), 906 F.2d 942 (3d Cir. 1990).
205. For a critique of the majority's reasoning and holding, see id. at 946 (Cowen, J. dissenting).
206. Id. at 947-48.
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antee as a "service" is a potentially better approach if the value of the
service were ascertainable.2 ° 7 Such value could be the fair market value
of the guarantee at the time the guarantor made it.2"8 This fair market
value likely would be less than the amount eventually honored, and less
than the amount of credit that the guarantee helped make possible.2' A
fair market value of the guarantee made in Kumar Bavishi likely would
have been insufficient to completely shield that preferential transfer.210
The creditor's subsequent honoring of the guarantee did not provide
new value to the debtor's estate." The dissent correctly viewed the
post-petition payment as merely shifting the unsecured creditors.212 No
new value offset the previous preferential payment.2"3
Contrary to the majority's analysis,2" 4 the granting of the guarantee
did deplete the estate to other creditors' detriment. Although the debtor
partnership received an infusion of cash from the bank, a concurrent ob-
ligation to the bank matched this cash.21 5 Cash flowed from the partner-
ship to an unsecured creditor in return for a reduction of unsecured
debt.216 The majority incorrectly applied the new value provided by the
bank to both transactions.217 The dissent appropriately observed that the
new value exception only shielded a transfer to the extent the creditor
gave new value.21 8 No new value offset the preferential payment to the
limited partner.21 9 The payment depleted the debtor's estate.220 The ma-
207. Id. at 948.
208. For a suggested calculation of such a fair market valuation, see id. at 948. See also In re
Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 200 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[to value a contingent liability it is
necessary to discount it by the probability that the contingency will occur and the liability become
real") (Posner, J.).
209. See 906 F.2d at 948.
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
212. See 906 F.2d at 951.
213. Id.
214. For the majority's analysis of this issue in Kumar Bavishi, see supra notes 157-60 and ac-
companying text.
215. See 906 F.2d at 945.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See 906 F.2d at 949.
219. It can be argued that some new value was given in that the guarantor provided the fair
market value of the guarantee to the debtor. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text. How-
ever, the dissent correctly pointed out that this valuation likely was less than the preferential pay-
ment by the debtor. 906 F.2d at 948. Thus, even if some new value was given, it was insufficient to
completely protect the preference from avoidance. Id.
220. If no new value was given, creditors were deprived of the whole preference. If some new
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jority's finding of new value in the granting of the guarantee undermines
the primary bankruptcy principle of equal distribution among creditors.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts should construe "new value" in a manner that reflects the ex-
clusive statutory definition.221 Furthermore, courts should apply that
definition in a way that supports the principles underlying preference
law.222 Transfers that deplete the debtor's estate to other creditors' detri-
ment should not be protected from avoidance by an improper use of the
new value exceptions. Congress mandated a statutory framework of
avoidable preferences and exceptions. Courts should not upset that
balance.
Thomas J. Palazzolo
value was given, see supra note 219, then creditors were deprived of the portion of the preference not
offset by the fair market value of the guarantee. Id.
221. See, eg., Simon v. Engineered Protections Sys., Inc. (In re Hatfield Elec. Co.), 91 Bankr.
782 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
222. See, eg., Drabkin v. A.I. Credit Corp., 800 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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